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What’s Religion Got to Do with It:  United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the 
Free Exercise of Religion and the Clash of Cultures 
By Vincent Gilbert 
I. Introduction 
The Framers of the First Amendment religion clauses likely could not have 
conceptualized the expansive interpretation that it receives today.1  While some scholars have 
determined that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were theist,2 nothing in their literature 
suggests that they were better equipped to define religion than courts are today.  For example, 
James Madison held a rather progressive view of religion.3 Indeed, Madison argued that religion 
is “the duty to which we owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.”4  However, 
Jefferson cannot be considered to have had such a definition of religion because he stated, 
“religious freedom was meant to be universal…to comprehend within the mantle of its protection 
the Jew and Gentile, the Christian and Mohametan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every 
denomination.”5  While Jefferson’s quote may seem to be inclusive, there is a marked difference 
between Madison’s view and Jefferson’s view.  Madison’s position suggests that the subsequent 
actions that a believer takes in accordance with his/her religious beliefs should be protected.6  
This is evident by his reference to “discharging” one’s religious duties.  Conversely, Jefferson 
provides a vague, limited, and disparaging (i.e. referring to certain beliefs as infidel) description 
for what is encompassed in First Amendment religious protection.7  Nothing in Jefferson’s 
statement hints that he is willing to afford constitutional protection for the religious actions of 
                                                          
1 John Sexton, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). 
2 Id at 1060. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.   
5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION 133 n.1 (1911). 
6 Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1060. 
7 Id. 
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those groups mentioned.8  This early dichotomy in thought and approach towards constitutional 
protection exists today as courts perform legal acrobatics to determine what religious acts or 
behaviors have constitutional protection.  United States Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to 
indicate a trend toward finding constitutional protection for those religious practices that 
conform to western concepts of religion and a denial of protection for those acts that do not 
demonstrate the same conformity. 
When Christian values, beliefs and practices are protected by law, a dominant Christian 
culture is preserved.  All groups seek cultural stability, even endorsement.  But when minority 
religious groups seek protection, they usually do so to preserve their culture.  Such efforts are 
often met with hostility from the dominant culture within law and society. 
II. Cultural Parity and Disparity 
An early United States Supreme Court case seems to deviate from the Constitutional 
mandate, that the government not establish a religion, by recognizing Christianity as the common 
law of Pennsylvania.9  Although the case primarily focused on the enforceability of a charitable 
trust, the Court found that it was able to enforce the trust because it did not contain any 
“regulations or restrictions…which are inconsistent with the Christian religion.”10 The court 
further clarified its position by stating: 
 So that we are compelled to admit that although Christianity be a part of the  
 common law of the state, yet it is so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin 
 and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled 
 and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.11 
 
                                                          
8 Id.   
9 Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 198 (1844). 
10 Id at 201. 
11 Id. 
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The Court’s adherence to Christian principles stems from the values of the ‘old world’ carried 
over by the framers of the Constitution.12The theocratic language of the Court not only departs 
from the plain language of the First Amendment, it was subsequently cited by several state cases 
extending beyond the first quarter of the twentieth century.13  The language of the Court suggests 
a preference for activities that conform to Christian and ‘old world’ values, and provides insight 
for later decisions made by the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of religious 
activities.  
Perhaps on the clearest examples of religion serving as proxy for culture came in a 
Supreme Court decision addressing the issue of education.  In the majority opinion in Board of 
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated a New York law that created a school district inhabited exclusively by member of the 
Satmar Hasidic sect of Judaism.14    The Satmar community is a strongly religious group that 
interprets the Torah strictly.15    As a result of the group’s strict adherence to their religious text 
they intentionally abstain from activities that may foster assimilation.16    For example the 
Satmar’s:  “(1) segregate the sexes outside of the home, (2) speak Yiddish as their primary 
language, (3) eschew television, radio, and English-language publications, and (4) dress in 
distinctive ways that include head coverings and special garments for boys and modest dresses 
for girls.”17    In addition to the aforementioned activities the Satmar’s further distance 
themselves by privately educating their children.18    However, despite privately educating their 
                                                          
12 Id. 
13 State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663, 666 (1879); Ecker v. First Nat. Bank, 1 A  849, 853 Md. (1885); Shaw v. Board of 
Education of Village of Hobbs, N. M., 31 P.2d 993, 997 N.M. (1934). 
14 Bd. of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
15 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 691. 
16 Id. 
17 Id at 691. 
18 Id. 
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children the Satmar’s did not provide educational services for special needs children in violation 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.19   
Although the Satmars chose to send their special needs children to public schools, they 
quickly recanted because of the ridicule the children received due to their differences.20  The 
ridicule and subsequent withdrawal of the students from public schools led to this case because, 
according the United States Supreme Court the law enacted by the state of New York entitling 
the Satmar children to educational services was an unconstitutional establishment of religion by 
entangling state power with a religious group.21   
Despite the majority’s decision the issue remains of whether New York State’s 
accommodation of the special needs children is indeed a religious issue at all.  For example, 
according to the facts the Satmar children were not antagonized because of their faith but rather 
their cultural differences.22    This point is corroborated by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.   
In that dissent, Justice Scalia argues that it is the cultural distinctiveness of the Satmar 
community and not their theological distinctiveness that motivates the majority opinion.23  
Justice Scalia states: 
on what basis does Justice Souter conclude that it is the theological distinctiveness 
rather than the cultural distinctiveness that was the basis 
for the New York State’s decision?  The normal assumption would be  
that it was the latter, since it was not theology, but dress, language, and  
cultural alienation that posed the educational problem for the children.24  
 
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21Joanne Kuhns, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grummet:  The Supreme Court Shall 
Make No Law Defining an Establishment of Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1599. 
22 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 691. 
23 Id at 740. 
24 Id.  
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Justice Scalia makes a poignant argument as it demonstrates that the apprehension expressed in 
the majority opinion is unfounded.  Moreover, Justice Scalia argues that if the same set of facts 
were present but the parents of the children had no religious affiliation, the majority would find 
that the Establishment Clause has not been offended.25  He understood that allowing the school 
district would enhance cultural cohesion, not religion.     
Many modern cases demonstrate how the Court minimizes the religious practices and 
indeed the culture of minority religious groups.  Challenges relating to Sunday closings, a mark 
of Christian dominance, were easily dismissed.  Braunfield v. Brown presents a different legal 
issue but the cultural clash is still present.26 In Braunfield the petitioners are Orthodox Jews 
arguing that a Pennsylvania statute proscribing retail sales on Sunday is a violation of their First 
Amendment free exercise rights.27 As Orthodox Jews they argue that their religion requires that 
they observe their Sabbath from Friday evening until Saturday evening.28 Therefore, petitioners 
argue that by being compelled to close on Sunday they lose out on substantial revenue that 
compensated for their Saturday closing, and thus are deprived of earning a livelihood.29  In 
addition to the economic loss they suffer, the appellants maintain that the statute will deter new 
adherents to the Orthodox Jewish faith and that their religion is being subjected to discriminatory 
treatment by the state by being forced to close on Sunday.30 
 The Court begins with a historical analysis that accurately describes the cultural 
dichotomy that they are addressing in the present case.31  The Court begins in Virginia in 1776 
                                                          
25 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 741. 
26 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
27 Id at 601. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 602. 
31 Id at 602. 
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with the evolution of Sunday closing laws.32 While Virginia had a stated policy of respecting all 
faiths it remained adamant that citizens abstain from commerce.33  The state maintained that 
Sunday closing laws were a legislative means used to promote “a day of community tranquility, 
respite and recreation, a day when the atmosphere is one of calm and relaxation rather than one 
of commercialism, as it is during the other six days of the week.”34 The state supports its 
picturesque depiction of Sunday by positing that the state has a preoccupation with improving 
the health, safety, morals, and general well-being of its citizens.35 After the historical analysis the 
Court finds that there is no constitutional violation in the present case, because the state may 
impose legislation that regulates secular activity, so long as it does not criminalize a religious 
practice.36 
The Court’s opinion seems to overlook the cultural contrast that lies beneath the 
appellants’ claim and the Court’s position.  Aside from the monetary loss that the appellant’s 
suffer, they also claim that the Sunday laws are a deterrent to future adherents of the Orthodox 
Jewish faith.37    Indeed, it would appear that appellants are concerned with the continued 









35 Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 602-03. 
36Id at 606.  
37 Id at 602. 
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III.  Polygamy 
Perhaps the clearest judicial statements of dominant Christian culture appears in the 
polygamy cases.  In the seminal polygamy case of Reynolds v. United States38 the clash of 
cultures, and not religion, is apparent based on the language used by the Justice writing the 
opinion.  In Reynolds the petitioner is challenging the impartiality of the jurors selected and the 
constitutionality of a law proscribing polygamy.39 On the issue of polygamy the court provides 
context for its rejection of the Mormon challenge to the statute prohibiting polygamy.  The 
statute at issue reads in pertinent part:   
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether  
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States have 
exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.40 
Petitioner is seeking an exemption to the statute as a violation his First Amendment right to free 
exercise of his religion because as a member of the Mormon Church it was his religious duty to 
engage in polygamy.41  In addition to polygamy being a religious obligation, petitioner testified 
that failure to engage in the practice would lead to eternal damnation in the afterlife.42  Moreover 
according to the petitioner his second marriage was permissible because the ceremony was 
conducted by a parishioner having such authority.43 
In introducing its opposition to petitioner’s claims, the Court begins by providing legislative 
history of the Constitutional language authorizing the free exercise of religion.44  According to 
the Court both the definition and genesis of the Constitutional language can be found in Thomas 
                                                          
38 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. 
42 Id.   
43 Id.   
44 Id at 164. 
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Jefferson’s correspondence regarding the proposed amendment.45 Jefferson found that the Free 
Exercise clause “permits a man to exercise his religion between him and his God,…but he has no 
natural right in opposition of his social duties.”46 The latter part of Jefferson’s statements makes 
it clear that while the Government may not generally impose on one’s practice of religion, 
governmental imposition is permissible when a religious act violates the law.47 
Once establishing the context of the Free Exercise clause the court explains the historical 
opposition to the practice of polygamy.48 Ironically, Chief Justice Waite does not begin with 
American opposition to the practice of polygamy.  Instead, Justice Waite pits European culture 
against African and Asian cultures by stating that polygamy was almost an exclusive feature of 
the latter two cultures.49  Indeed, the Justice posits that until the arrival of the Mormon Church 
polygamy was foreign to the European culture.50 In addition, to demonstrate the cultural disdain 
for the practice of polygamy, Justice Waite explains that the practice of polygamy was an offense 
punishable by death at common law.51  The historically cultural contempt for the practice of 
polygamy, rejection of a Mormon exemption, and the subsequent finding of guilt of Mr. 
Reynolds demonstrates that the Court was more concerned with a practice that is antithetical to 
the pre-American and American values.  Mr. Reynolds Mormon faith is not a central feature of 
the trial.  Rather, the Court is again dealing with a cultural practice that offends the American 
values system.    
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id.   
47 Id.   
48 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
49 Id.   
50 Id. 
51 Id at 165.   
Page 9 of 22 
 
Early case law reveals an abhorrence for the practice of polygamy.52  In Miles v. U.S. the 
challenger, John Miles, is challenging his conviction of polygamy in the state of Utah.53   
However, in Miles the Court not only admonishes the practice of polygamy; it departs from the 
language in Vidal by disregarding the accused’s claims that polygamy is a sincere practice of his 
religion.54 Readers may recall that in Vidal the Court unquestionably accepted the “divine origin 
and truth” of the Christian faith.55 However in Miles the language of the opinion puzzlingly 
demonstrates a callousness towards the defendant’s faith.56 Subsequent case law offers an 
explanation for the disparity in treatment.  
 A decade later in Davis v. Beason, the callous language in the opinion of Miles is clarified 
when the Court decided on a case that challenged the constitutionality of an Idaho statute that 
disqualified any person that practiced bigamy from holding public office, voting, teaching, etc.57 
The tone of the Court’s opinion towards the challengers reveals a visceral aversion for the 
defendant’s religious practice.58 The Court’s aversion is grounded in what appears to be a 
preference for Christianity:   
  Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the law of all civilized and Christian  
  countries…They tend to destroy the purity of marriage relation, to disturb 
  the peace of families, to degrade women, and to debase men.  Few crimes 
  are more pernicious to the best interests of society, and receive more general 
  or more deserved punishment.  To extend exemption from punishment for  
such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the community.59 
                                                          
52See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Miles v. U.S., 103 U.S. 304, (1880); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 
333 (1890). 
53 Miles v. U.S., 103 U.S. 304 (1880). 
54 Id at 307. 
55 Vidal, 43 U.S. at 198. 
56 Miles, 103 U.S. at 307. 
57 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
58 Id at 341. 
59 Id at 341.   
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In the aforementioned the Supreme Court tempers its vehemence against the practice of 
polygamy by assuming the values of the nation and the subsequent moral declination that will 
occur if polygamy is not prohibited by law.60 To accomplish this dubious purpose the Court 
analogizes civilization and Christianity and the concomitant moral degradation that will occur 
with the practice of polygamy.61 The court’s position appears to offend the Free Exercise clause 
of the First Amendment because it seems to deny what Mormon’s consider a required religious 
practice.62  In addition, it would appear that the Court has deviated from James Madison’s 
position by denying “man’s discharge of duty to his creator.”63 
However, despite the Framer’s view on Free Exercise the court resumes its posture of 
religious assumption regarding acceptable behaviors by stating, “to call their advocacy a tenet of 
religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.”64 The Court is showing an early tension 
between religious practices and society’s norms.  However, the dilemma is easily dismissed 
when the Court finds that religious practices are subordinate to the law of the land.65 Although 
that sentiment is to be repeated often, i.e. religious practices are subordinate to the law of the 
land, this case, like many others, provides some insight into what practices are acceptable and the 
criteria used for determining their acceptability.  
Aside from the moral condemnation afforded polygamy, in Cope v. Cope the Supreme 
Court was faced with the concomitant issue of illegitimacy.66 Cope was a matter of first 
impression as the Court had to determine the constitutionality of a Utah statute that permitted 
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id at 341. 
63 Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056, 1060. 
64 Beason, 133 U.S at. 341-42. 
65 Id at 342. 
66 Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891). 
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illegitimate children to share in the estate of a deceased parent the same as a legitimate child.67 
The Court begrudgingly determined that while the statute did not contemplate illegitimate 
children from a polygamous relationship, some such children could, nonetheless, share in their 
parent’s estate.68 According to the opinion it was Congress’ position that only those illegitimate 
children born within twelve months of the passage of the statute could inherit from their parent’s 
estate.69  All children born thereafter could not inherit from their parent’s estate.70 It is evident 
that the contempt for the practice of polygamy reached beyond the parties directly engaged and 
affected the lives of children borne out of illegal unions.  However, this nineteenth century 
disdain would persists for many years to come.   
Indeed case law from the mid-twentieth century reveals that the attitude of the court had 
not changed much.71 In Cleveland v. U.S. the petitioners are challenging their conviction under 
the Mann Act, which proscribes transporting women across state line for the purpose of 
prostitution.72 Their convictions were based on their engagement in a polygamous relationship, 
which meant any subsequent wife beyond the first was considered unlawful under the Mann 
Act.73 Consistent with prior case law the Court expressed its detestation of polygamy, and quoted 
the Reynolds’ opinion stating that polygamy was almost an exclusive feature of Asian and 
African cultures.74 Moreover, the practice has always been unacceptable in European nations.75 
More poignantly the juxtaposition between Christianity and other religions and the disparate 
treatment they receive is made clear when the Court stated: 
                                                          
67 Cope, 137 U.S. at 684. 
68 Id at 689. 
69 Id at 688. 
70 Id. 
71 Cleveland v. U.S., 329 U.S. 14 (1946). 
72 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 16. 
73 Id. 
74 Id at 15. 
75 Id. 
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  The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy 
  is, in a measure, a return to barbarism.  It is contrary to the spirit of  
  Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the  
  western world…The establishment of maintenance of polygamous households 
  is a notorious example of promiscuity.76 
 
The above quote demonstrates the contrast between the Christian values which the Court finds 
acceptable and those that it does not.  Moreover, the religious deference extended to the 
Christian values earlier in Vidal77 are categorically denied to non-Christian values in 
Cleveland.78 It is clear that the religious preference for Christian and old world values still 
permeated the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century.  
IV. Religious Sincerity 
Over a century later the United States Supreme Court echoed the sentiments of James 
Madison in U.S. v. Ballard when it stated, “with man’s relations to his maker and the obligations 
he may think they impose, on interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, 
designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the moral of its people, are not interfered 
with.”79  In Ballard the court was confronted with the issue of whether the defendants could be 
charged with making false representations about their divine or supernatural powers in an 
attempt to defraud its followers out of money, property, etc.80  The defendants’ challenged their 
convictions on the grounds that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited the state from bringing 
charges against them regarding the validity of their religious claims.81  The court supported its 
rationale by stating: 
                                                          
76 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 15- 16. 
77 Vidal, 43 U.S. at 198. 
78 Id at 20. 
79 U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
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  The first amendment has a dual aspect.  It not only forestalls compulsion by 
  law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship but 
also safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion…Men may 
believe what they cannot prove.  They may not be put to the proof of their 
religious doctrines or beliefs.82 
 
The Court’s statements demonstrate that the government is prohibited from making inquiries into 
the religious validity of the defendant’s claims.   
To further clarify the Court’s position on the state making religious inquiries it 
analogized the defendant’s claims with the transcendental occurrences of the New Testament.83 
The Court recognized the popularity of the belief in Immaculate Conception and the resurrection 
and noted that if the miracles in the New Testament are accepted without state condemnation, 
then the claims of the defendants are likewise constitutionally protected.84  Government can 
require that a religious claim be sincere, but it cannot require that it be true.  The Court’s position 
seems to represent the spirit of the Free Exercise clause, but that seem broad view becomes 
astonishingly narrow when it addresses the Nation of Islam. 
V. Black Muslims 
In Fulwood v. Clemmer the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
addressed the issue of hostility towards non-Western religions and practices, when it reviewed a 
case by a member of the Nation of Islam.85 The Nation of Islam is a religious organization 
founded by Elijah Muhammad which taught a form of Islam designed to help African Americans 
improve their conditions in America.86  In Fulmer the petitioner claimed religious discrimination 
                                                          
82 Id at 86. 
83 Id at 87. 
84 Id.   
85 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (1962). 
86 Alex Haley, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964). 
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when members of the Nation of Islam were not allowed to hold religious meetings in prison.87 
The respondent, Donald Clemmer, Director of the Department of Corrections for the District of 
Columbia, refused Mr. Fulwood’s request for religious meetings because Mr. Clemmer believed 
that Muslims teach hatred.88 Mr. Clemmer stated: 
  I don’t know any other religion that teaches racial hatred as an essential 
  part of the faith of the religion.  There are many religions which have  
practiced racial hatred at various times, but this movement is the only 
movement that I know of which makes it a tenet of the faith that all  
white people should be hated.  The Muslim’s consider the white man  
as their natural enemy according to a handbook which a witness for 
petitioner regards as a standard and recognized text of religious  
denominations in the United States.89 
 
The court goes on to acknowledge the religion as an admixture of political aspirations, economic 
goals, racial prejudice with substantial emphasis on the Muslim faith.90  Although the court 
found that the petitioner should not be discriminated against due to his religion91, the 
antagonistic language used toward the Nation of Islam would be repeated in subsequent cases.  
In Clay v. U.S., then heavyweight champion, Muhammad Ali, challenged his conviction 
for willful refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces.92 Muhammad Ali challenged his 
conviction on the grounds that he is a member of the Nation of Islam and therefore a 
conscientious objector to war.93 To satisfy the requirement as a conscientious objector a 
registrant must demonstrate the following:  (1) he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, 
(2) his opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed, and 
                                                          
87 Fulwood, 206 F. Supp. at 372. 
88 Id at 373. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.   
91 Fulwood, 206 F. Supp. at 379. 
92 Clay v. U.S., 403 U.S. 698 (1971). 
93 Id at 699. 
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(3) his objection is sincere.94 The government contends that Mr. Ali’s conviction should be 
upheld because he is not genuinely opposed to war, but only selective about which wars he 
would choose to fight.95The government stated: 
  It seems clear that the teaching of the Nation of Islam precludes fighting 
  for United States not because of objections to participation to war in  
  any form but rather because of political and racial objections to policies 
  of the United States as interpreted by Elijah Muhammad.  It is therefore 
  our conclusion that registrant’s claimed objections to participation in war 
  insofar as they based on the teaching of the Nation of Islam, rest on  
  grounds which primarily are political and racial.96 
 
The government later conceded its position regarding Mr. Ali’s religious sincerity when it 
became evident that he was not merely a member of the Nation of Islam to avoid induction into 
war.97   
Less than one year later in Joseph v. U.S., the Supreme Court is again asked to review the 
claims of a member of the Nation of Islam that refuses to join the military as a conscientious 
objector.98 Despite the rhetoric being identical to that in Clay, the government doubted the 
religious sincerity of Mr. Joseph.99  That claim was based on the following statement made by 
Mr. Joseph years earlier when he was 17: 
  We believe that we who declared ourselves to be Rightous [sic] 
  Muslims Should not Participate in wars which take the lives of  
  humans.  We do not believe this nation should force us to take 
   part in such wars, for we have nothing to gain from it unless  
  America agrees to give us the necessary territory wherein we  
  may have something to die for…I receive my training from the  
  Honorable Elijah Muhammad Last Messenger of Allah Leader  
  and Teacher of the Nation of Islam herein the Wilderous [sic] 
                                                          
94 Id at 700. 
95 Id at 701. 
96 Id at 702. 
97 Id.   
98 Joseph v. U.S., 405 U.S. 1006 (1972). 
99 Id at 1006. 
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  of North America.100 
 
Mr. Joseph’s statements seem to be a more detailed explanation than that offered in Clay.101 The 
words of Mr. Joseph demonstrate a keen awareness, similar to that in the Grumet case.102 As 
previously mentioned, in Grumet the plaintiffs are aware that allowing that their children to be 
exposed to secular children has a traumatic psychological effect.103 Indeed, in Grumet the claim 
of psychological trauma may have been preemptive, as nothing in the case seems indicate that 
any child had actually suffered a traumatic event.104  However, Mr. Joseph’s awareness is based 
on his understanding of the travail of African Americans in America.  Mr. Joseph is not engaging 
in hyperbole when he stated, “we do not believe this nation should force us to take part in such 
wars, for we have nothing to gain from it unless America agrees to give use the necessary 
territory wherein we may have something to die for.105  Mr. Joseph is showing an acute 
understanding for several aspects of life for African Americans.  His statement reveals that he 
comprehends that it would be irrational to kill or be killed for a country that supports an 
economic, educational, and social disparity based on race.  Furthermore, as a member of the 
group that receives the brunt of that social dynamic his rationale is evident.  However, without 
questioning his religious sincerity, Mr. Joseph’s religious claim106 is identical to the claims of all 
the others.  Just as in the Grumet case where the Supreme Court explains the origin of the Satmar 
community107, Mr. Joseph too recognizes himself as a part of a community whose religious 
beliefs are subsequent to other identifiers.  Therefore, the members of the Nation of Islam are 
                                                          
100 Id. 
101 Clay, 403 U.S. at 702. 
102 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 691. 
103 Id at 691 
104 Id at 692. 
105 Joseph, 405 U.S. at 1006. 
106 Id. 
107 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 690-91. 
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expressing the same sentiments as the other religious groups as they are using their religious 
beliefs to preserve their cultural community. 
VI. Education 
Likewise in Wisconsin v. Yoder108 cultural preservation, as opposed to religious tenets, is 
the central issue of the case.  But here it is the cultural preservation of a traditional Christian 
community, so its stability and protection become an urgent priority for the Court.  In the Yoder 
case, Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller- members of the Old Order Amish Religion- and Adin 
Yutzy- member of the Amish Mennonite Church- are challenging their conviction of violating 
the state of Wisconsin’s compulsory school laws.109  Collectively the respondents argue that 
Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance law is a violation of their First Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights as it threatens the continuity of Amish communities.110  Respondents 
supported their position by stating: 
  …[R]espondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of the Old Order 
  communities generally, that their children’s attendance at high school,  
  public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.  They 
  believed that by sending their children to high school, they would not only 
  expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community, 
  but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation and  
  that of their children.111 
 
Although the aforementioned quote makes reference to the term religion, respondents make it 
clear that exposure to other communities threatens their cultural viability.112  To further 
demonstrate this point it is stated, “…Old Order Amish communities are characterized by a 
                                                          
108 Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (U.S. 1972).   
109 Id at 207. 
110 Id at 209.   
111 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.   
112 Id.   
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fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the 
world and worldly influence.”113 The latter half of the quote, i.e. “separate and apart from the 
world and worldly influence”, seems more concerned with creating a homogenous community as 
opposed to religious tenets.114  This appears to be evident by their agrarian lifestyle described in 
the case: 
  A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their devotion  
  to a life in harmony with nature and the soil , as exemplified by the  
  simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America during  
  much of our early national life.    Amish beliefs require members of the 
  community to make their living by farming or closely related activites. 
  Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines  
  the entire mode of life of its adherents…Amish society emphasizes informal 
  learning-through-doing; a life of goodness , rather than a life of intellect; 
  wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community welfare, rather  
  than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, 
  contemporary worldly society.115 
 
Indeed, judging by the language in the opinion it seems clear that the Amish are concerned with 
cultural continuity, as many of their professed religious tenets seems more concerned with 
shielding their ways from those not associated with their tradition.116 
The emphasis on cultural and communal viability being intertwined with societal 
isolation forms the basis for the respondent’s case.  Although respondents concede that education 
up to the eighth grade is necessary for the rudimentary activities of everyday Amish life, they 
argue that education beyond that point infuses values that are antithetical to both their religion 
and way of life.117  The respondent’s support their position by positing that education beyond the 
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eighth grade instills competitiveness, worldly success, and intellectual acumen over the Amish 
approach of informal learning through “doing it yourself “and more devotion to spiritual 
development.118 Indeed, the Amish position seems almost entirely predicated on the premise that 
exposure to the outside world beyond a certain age threatens the ideals that they have so long 
preserved.119 
The crux of the litigation before the Court is whether the state’s interest in providing 
universal education is greater than the Amish’s need to preserve their way of life.120  Writing for 
the court, Chief Justice Burger pits the state’s interest in providing education for its citizens 
against a parent’s right to direct the religious upbringing of the child.121  In his analysis, Chief 
Justice Burger recognizes that the fundamental right of a free exercise of religion is a 
longstanding right that has a history in American jurisprudence of taking precedent over socially 
important interest.122  In fact, Justice Burger makes it clear that the right to freedom of religious 
exercise predates the social interest in universal education.123  Despite the longstanding tradition 
of freedom of religious exercise the Court finds that the respondent’s claims can only defeat the 
state’s interest in providing education if their claims are “rooted in religious belief.”124  To 
demonstrate that their claims are rooted in religious belief the court found that the Amish must 
show that their claims are not predicated on their “subjective evaluation and rejection of the 
contemporary values accepted by the majority…”125  The Court found that the Old Order Amish 
way of life was not merely an arbitrary rejection of values because of their literal interpretation 
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of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, “be not conformed to this world.”126  In addition to the 
Court’s finding of their strict interpretation of the Biblical verse, an expert witnessed testified 
that the “Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their entire way of 
life…”127  
The state’s primary arguments for why Wisconsin’s compulsory school laws should be 
enforced are:  (1) education is necessary to prepare citizens for active participation in the 
political process, and (2) education promotes self-reliance and self-sufficiency.128  The Amish 
were able to successfully counter the state’s position by presenting an expert that testified that 
the education that the Amish children receive beyond the eighth grade is sufficient for them to 
survive as law-abiding adults in their community.129  In addition, evidence was presented 
demonstrating that the one or two more years beyond the eighth grade that their children would 
receive under Wisconsin law would not advance them in their community.130  Moreover, 
according to the expert, “compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with 
it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist 
today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into  society at large, or be forced to 
migrate to some other and more tolerant region.”131 Furthermore, the expert testifies that 
exposure to “worldly” values beyond the eighth grade could cause psychological harm to the 
children.132  The psychological harm discussed in Yoder, combined with the threat of 
undermining their way of life aligns with the Grumet case.   
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In both of these cases the groups are arguing that exposure to groups unlike themselves 
causes psychological harm and presents the concomitant threat of undermining their way of life.  
Indeed, in both of these cases preservation of culture and way of life are the gravamen of their 
arguments, not religion.  Therefore, it would seem that what is really being litigated in these 
cases is the conservation of tradition, with the Free Exercise Clause serving as the constitutional 
standard to protect that tradition.   
VII. Conclusion 
A review of the several significant decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the 
topic of the Religion clauses seems to suggest that the Court has a preference for religious 
practices that align more with traditional, western concepts of Christianity.  For example, the 
Court posits little objection to the Amish’s violation of compulsory school laws.133  According to 
the opinion in that case the Court agreed that exposure beyond the eighth grade for Amish 
children was potentially detrimental to their way of life.134  In contrast, the Grumet Court gives 
no regard to the Orthodox Jew’s claims that their children’s exposure to non-members of their 
faith could have damaging effects.135 Finally, in Ballard the court showed unprecedented 
deference for an admitted religious fraud.136 
Ironically, that same deference is not extended in other cases.  Beginning with the issue 
of polygamy the Court shows a long-tradition of cultural repugnance for the practice.137 Indeed 
the opinion regards the practice of polygamy as being a practice exclusive to the Asian and 
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African cultures.138 Furthermore, the Court based its position on the finding that historically at 
common law in Europe the practice of polygamy was punishable by death.139 Indeed Supreme 
Court jurisprudence reveals over a century of case law rejecting the professed Mormon religious 
practice of polygamy.140 
In addition, the skepticism towards the religious authenticity of the conscientious 
objectors in the Nation of Islam also reveals a conspicuous hostility for that faith.141 As is 
apparent in the Joseph and Clay cases the court is attempting to determine if their opposition to 
war is a genuine tenet of their faith.142 Although the petitioner’s religious claims are ultimately 
validated, the inquiries made in their respective cases are absent in the cases that align more with 
traditional, western notions of Christianity.  It appears that partiality permeates United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment Religion Clauses and the 
subsequent religious practice of various groups.  Cultural stability, which is available through the 
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